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Deleuze said that he detested Hegelianism and dialectics: this paper claims that Deleuze is contra 
Hegel because he has and proposes a different philosophical system. Thus, I suggest that if we want to 
understand the reason of such a “disgust,” we need to focus the philosophical question that moves the 
entire Deleuzian system (§ 1). Then, I explain that if the ground-question of Hegel’s philosophy is “how 
is it possible that things are surpassed, that they go on?”, the Deleuzian one is “how is it that there is 
always something new, that things come out?” (§ 2). Finally, I discuss how desire can be considered as 
a key-example for seeing how the perspectives of the two thinkers diverge (§ 3).
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I have always felt that I am an empiricist, 
that is, a pluralist. […] The aim is not to 
rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to 
find the condition under which something 
new is produced (creativeness) (D: vii).1
Indeterminacy […] does not invite us to 
abandon reason but to reconnect with the 
true reason of the thing in the process of 
being made, the philosophical reason that is 
not determination but difference (DI: 31).
1. Thumbs Down for the Dialectic
One thing is pretty well known, at least 
among Deleuzian scholars: Gilles Deleuze 
stated that what he “most detested” in his 
1 Deleuzian works explicitly quoted will have 
following abbreviations: EP – Deleuze 1990; 
B – Deleuze 1991; DR – 1994; N – Deleuze 
1995; DI – Deleuze 2004; NP – Deleuze 
2006; RF – Deleuze 2007; D – Deleuze-
Parnet 1987.
education in the history of philosophy “was 
Hegelianism and dialectics” (N: 6). It is also 
quite known that Deleuze had in mind the 
French reading of Georg Hegel, according 
to which the human consciousness would 
proceed toward an ultimate state of perfec-
tion through a process of negation, that is, 
in a more ontological sense, the Absolute 
would finally return “forward back” to 
itself via negation. But, in brief, what does 
Deleuze conceptually say about Hegel?
Already in 1954, Deleuze affirmed that 
“contradiction is less and not more than 
difference,” that is, contradiction is the 
phenomenal and anthropological aspect of 
difference (DI: 15–18), while – as he will 
express later in his major work dedicated 
to the problem of difference – actually 
difference “is the noumenon closest to phe-
nomenon” (DR: 222), so that difference is 
more profound than contradiction, and 
“it is not difference which presupposes op-
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position, but opposition which presupposes 
difference” (DR: 51).
Two years later and through Henri 
Bergson, Deleuze underlines that meant as 
internal – that is, as duration – the difference 
could be no more confused with negati vity 
(difference of a thing from everything it 
is not), neither with diversity (external 
difference of one thing from another), nor 
with identity (difference of things sharing 
a common element or ground): difference 
is pure heterogeneity that differs from itself, 
in itself and by itself, or – better said – it is 
the continuous process of “heterogenization,” 
alteration and not alterity, immediate dif-
ference and not mediate difference, and so 
on (DI: 24–51; see also B: 37–49).
More specifically, Deleuze thinks that 
Hegel subordinates difference not just to 
negation or to identity, but to the identity 
of identity and difference, so that difference 
would be already placed on a path laid out 
by identity (DR: 44–50): in Hegel’s system, 
difference is destined to the development 
of opposition into contradiction and the 
resolution of contradiction (NP: 157). If 
we have negation, we don’t have difference; 
if we have homogeneity, we don’t have dif-
ference: Hegel would have summed these 
mistakes, linking negation and identity, so 
that his dialectical would not be able to 
grasp difference as such.
At first instance, according to Deleuze 
difference is a matter of tendency and not of 
distinction between static entities: for sure, 
we can distinguish one actual thing from 
another actual one, and we can also say that 
they are in a relationship of contradiction 
or opposition (that they negate each other); 
but this is possible because of their process 
of actualization, of their differing dura-
tion – in the verbal sense (cf. also DR: i.e. 
207, 235–236). Furthermore, the process 
of actualization could not be thought as a 
determinatio via negatio, neither as a realiza-
tion through the limitation of possibilities: 
it should be rather conceived as an expression 
of virtuality, or as a position and a develop-
ment of problems.
So, here we have the core of the issue: in 
Deleuzian perspective, if things limit and 
oppose each other, it is because, first of all, 
they affirm themselves, and not because 
they need to determine themselves through 
negation, neither because as such they are 
only referring to a general common identity. 
In other words, if, from the point of view of 
the “reactive forces,” the negativity comes 
first, then from the point of view of “active 
forces,” it is affirmativity that comes first; 
in talking about forces, it means that rather 
than being logical operations, affirmation 
and negation are first of all qualities of 
becoming (NP: 54) – namely, a matter of 
intensity and energy.
If it is true that Hegel may appear as a 
philosopher of the becoming, for him  – 
from the Deleuzian point of view – beco-
ming actually consists of the unity of a qual-
ity with its negation, that is, “in the ‘always 
already’ of being having passed over into 
nothing and nothing having passed over 
into being”:  Hegel treats becoming in terms 
of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, so that 
he always selects just one of the qualities in 
the qualitative unity of becoming, and “uses 
this to define movement” (Bryant 2008: 
141–142). In Hegel’s becoming, what is 
important is the identity of the becoming, 
an identity reached through a mediation 
“of negation of negation of negation, and 
so on,” which is always already at work.
In sum, the main features of Deleuzian 
“Anti-Hegelianism” are two. They are, as 
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the saying goes, two sides of the same coin: 
in Hegelianism, it happens that (a) identity 
“overlaps” difference, and (b) contradiction 
“exhausts” difference. a) Every particular 
difference is what it is only if it is referred 
to the general identity of the concept, or to 
the specific identity of another diffe rence 
(which, in turn, is different from that 
identity, and so on). b) Every particular dif-
ference is negated from the general identity 
of the concept, or from the specific identity 
of another difference (which, in turn, is 
everything it is not, and so on). This implies 
that, according to Deleuze, difference is not 
difference from, neither simply of, but it is 
difference for, with, between, or – better, as it 
will become clearer – difference in-between: 
it is this kind of difference that is “the suf-
ficient reason for change” (DR: 223).
Up until now, I have just resumed the 
general sense of Deleuze’s aversion toward 
Hegel’s philosophy. That said, I will try to 
explain why Deleuze cannot be anything 
else than an “Anti-Hegelian” thinker, that 
is, that there are structural philosophical 
reasons for this strong hatred. In order 
to do this, the field should be primarily 
delimitated, declaring (i) what I will not 
claim and (ii) what instead I will claim.
i)  I will not claim that there could not 
be a relationship between some (even 
important) aspects of their philosophies 
or that they could not share a same com-
mon ground. I will not claim that Hegel 
is not important in the development of 
Deleuze’s thought. I will not claim that 
Deleuze could not be read as a dialecti-
cian – although in a peculiar way. I will 
not claim that the Deleuzian reading of 
Hegel is true (or false). I will not claim 
that one of them is right. After all, on all 
these topics, the debate is currently gro-
wing, several position are being assumed, 
and even very technical analysis are more 
and more available, stressing that Hegel 
and Deleuze could be put together again 
for the first time (cf., i.e. Baugh 2009; 
Duffy 2006; Hardt 1993; Houle-Vernon 
2013; Simont 1997; Somers-Hall 2012).
ii)  I will claim that if we want to under-
stand the reason why Deleuze is contra 
Hegel, we need to focus on the core 
of the Deleuzian problem, that is, the 
philosophical question that moves the 
entire Deleuzian system, outli ning 
a comparison with the core of the 
Hegelian one (§ 2). Then, I will claim 
that desire can be considered as a key 
example for seeing how the perspectives 
of the two thinkers could be widely 
divergent (§ 3).
Thereby, I claim that one should not 
believe that Deleuze is contra Hegel because 
Hegel is an emblem of philosophy as a 
system, that is, because Deleuze is against 
system and systematicity as such; rather, 
Deleuze is contra Hegel for he has and 
proposes a different system. By system, we 
should intend not something governed 
by specific argumentative or rationalistic 
norms, neither by an end point of truth 
and knowledge, but instead something 
governed by the immanent lines of the 
articulation of the problem which itself 
is posing; that is, not something “whose 
coordinates are the Identical, the Similar, 
and the Analogous,” but instead something 
“in perpetual heterogeneity,” or – even 
better – “a heterogenesis” itself (RF: 361). 
Briefly, a system is something that insists 
and persists in posing and developing some 
fundamental questions (in actualizing a 
virtual), without answering to any general 
and external criterion (transcendence), but 
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inventing its own conditions (immanence). 
In this sense, it’s true that Deleuze’s philoso-
phy has “global systematic ambitions,” and 
is “a philosophy of everything,” construc-
ting “a system that maximizes its conceptual 
reach across fields and across different kinds 
of cases” (Williams 2016: 142).
Said otherwise, here I just want to out-
line a synoptical vision of the Hegelian and 
Deleuzian systems of thought, which clearly 
opens up to – if not necessitates of – a more 
analytical enquiry on the details of these 
systems and their relationships. But  – as 
Hegel himself would have said – we should 
not miss the forest for the trees, and above 
all here I will start from one simple – almost 
ingenuous – question and I will attempt to 
answer it: but in the end, why does Deleuze 
show all that animosity against Hegel? Fur-
thermore, this attitude is – to be honest – 
quite strange for a philosopher who has 
done of the stigmatization of the reactivity 
his own emblem. In conclusion, this paper 
tries to clarify if this strangeness could be 
better understood stating the key-questions 
that Hegel and Deleuze pose through their 
philosophies to themselves and to us: to 
offer a preliminary formulation, I suggest 
that if Hegel asks something as and after 
that, what happens? Deleuze instead asks 
something as and during that, what happens? 
In the next pages, I want to explain the 
meaning of such a statement.
2. Different Solutions for Different 
Problems. Unveiling the Trick
2.1. Separated at Birth
Jean-Luc Nancy, pointing out that Deleuze’s 
thought is a philosophy of transformation, 
states that the “parallel difference” between 
the philosophies of Derrida and Deleuze 
could be traced back in their different 
philosophical heritage: a German one for 
Derrida and a French one for Deleuze. In 
the first, the problem of the form is equal 
to the problem of its origin and end, namely 
of its birth and death; in the second, the 
problem of the form is equal to the problem 
of its transition, namely of its becoming 
(Nancy 2008: 15–25). Here, Nancy refers 
mostly to – respectively – Martin Heidegger 
and Henri Bergson, but we could easily say 
that the German fil rouge involves also the 
Hegelian system, at least in a double sense.
The first takes in Nancy himself, who 
elsewhere has presented Hegel as the 
thinker of the “restlessness of the negative,” 
where this negativity is to be understood 
not as a denial that fulfills and satisfies 
itself in totality, discovering its own end in 
identity, but rather as the incessant work 
of transfiguration of the self through the 
negative, without a final return to itself 
(cf. Nancy 2002). In other words, even if 
in Hegel the end would not be the same 
of the origin, we have nevertheless a rest-
less movement of taking and losing form, 
driven by the labor of the negative: forms 
are born, forms die; they are born thanks 
to the negativity, they die owing to the 
negativity.
The second instead takes in Catherine 
Malabou, who has gone deeper in this issue, 
stating that plasticity should be considered 
as the main ontological category of Hege-
lian thought (cf. mostly Malabou 2005). 
This means – first of all – that Hegelian 
synthesis is not a thinking of the closure of 
the totalization, but of the openness. Thus – 
secondly – futurity would play the main 
role within Hegel’s system due to the fact 
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that in order to be transformable (plastic), 
the self should be opened to the alterity of 
the future, which is by definition wholly 
inscrutable and unexpected, together able 
to give and receive form. It is quite hard 
to be sure that this “futuristic” Hegel is 
actually the real Hegel, that is – as it is to 
be explained – that the original and note-
worthy reading of Malabou gives account of 
the true problem posed by Hegel. However, 
even in such a perspective, it persists to be 
true that Hegel would care about the ques-
tion of the assumption and dissolution of 
form, of the emergence and explosion of 
form. In this sense, it could be true that the 
movement does not go toward identity, and 
also that it is not an endless process of unre-
solvable negativity; but this happens owing 
to the fact that the triumph of the identity 
and the definitiveness of the disruption are 
nothing but the two moments of a dialecti-
cal process of contradiction, that cannot 
be – in the Hegelian sense – abstracted. 
Here, transformation is conceived as the 
passage from birth to death and vice versa, 
as their contradictory alternance; but – we 
will see – Deleuze states that transformation 
is rather something different, or – more 
properly – the difference in itself.
So, it seems that, on the one hand, 
Hegel and Deleuze walk the same path 
(the attempt to understand the form), 
but also, on the other hand, that they can 
never really meet each other, at least for two 
reasons. The first is that one is moved by the 
negativity, the other by the affirmativity; the 
second is that one seems to seek for form-
configuration, the other for form-traversal.2
2  I have discussed this problem of the “form-
traversal” also in Pezzano 2016b and Pezzano 
2017.
That said, it would be too simple just 
to say that Hegel is a (or the) philosopher 
of the negation and Deleuze a (or the) 
philosopher of affirmation, thus Deleuze 
would be against dialectics, and that’s the 
end of the story. This is obviously true: to say 
the least, we can remember Hegel’s expres-
sions, such as “tarrying with the negative,” 
“Calvary of absolute spirit,” “negativity 
relating itself to itself,” “this Night, this 
empty nothing which contains everything 
in its simplicity,” and so on. Again, it is 
true that while Hegel seems to point out 
a teleological becoming, Deleuze looks for 
a sort of “adestinal” becoming, so that he 
cannot but refuse to recognize lack – the 
absence of the end – as the driving force 
behind becoming – and this is true even if 
one could say that Deleuze underestimates 
Hegel (cf. Malabou 1996). Lastly, it is 
true that for both Hegel and Deleuze the 
core of reality is movement, productivity 
and effectiveness, but while for the first 
the substance is the subject that goes out 
from itself and comes back to itself passing 
through negation, for the second nature is 
the process that endures in affirming and 
disclosing relations. But once we have made 
these opportune statements, have we really 
understood what is at stake?
In order to explain these aspects, I think 
that we need to go deeper in the sense of 
Hegelian insistence on negation, and – 
consequently – in its Deleuzian rejection: 
my claim is that we should ask ourselves 
what kind of problem is Hegel posing and 
facing, and if this is the same that Deleuze 
faces and poses – and I will answer no. I 
should declare myself: this kind of approach 
is already Deleuzian, because it considers 
that what is more relevant and remarkable 
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in a philosophical theory are not the solu-
tions but the problems. Said otherwise: in 
order to understand a philosopher and how 
he thinks (even before “what he thinks”), 
you need first of all to clarify what kind of 
questions he is posing, to himself and to us. 
Rather than looking for the (un)truthful-
ness of the specific statements of a philoso-
pher, first of all you have to look for what 
kind of problem a philosopher makes you 
see, perceive, or – more precisely – conceive.
In sum, you need to identify the ground 
impetus or the driving force behind a phi-
losophy as a whole: to find a problematic 
way through a philosophy in its entirety. 
In this way, you can also, to all effects, 
understand why a philosopher could be 
even radically divergent – implicitly or 
explicitly – from another one, as in the 
Hegel-Deleuze affair.
Now I will expose briefly, on the one 
hand, which is the Hegelian problem and 
which is the Deleuzian one, and – on the 
other hand – which are the main models 
underlying the formulation of these prob-
lems. In a few initial words, my idea is that 
Hegel and Deleuze do not just offer diverse 
or opposite or incommensurable solutions, 
but they pose different problems and give 
conceptual form to different experiences, 
thus their solutions could be even very 
distant.
2.2. Once It Happens, You Have to Deal 
With It. Hegel’s Recollection
Starting with Hegel, I suggest that the 
ground-issue of his philosophy is the at-
tempt to answer to the question why are 
things overcome? That is, “how is it possible 
that things are surpassed, that they go on?” 
Historically, as it has been suggested, this 
question could be considered a sort of “sym-
bolical doubling” of some social problems 
that troubled Hegel and his times: is it 
possible to leave behind both the theocratic 
and aristocratic Ancien Régime and the 
bourgeois and capitalistic Enlightenment 
without simply erasing them? Is it possible 
to legitimate the idea of an association of 
free and equal individuals, able at the same 
time to conserve, if not enrich, the previous 
traditions of civilization, mutual help and 
reciprocal benevolence? Is it possible to 
integrate the emancipatory effects of the 
Enlightenment with the exigence of not 
being overwhelmed by its radical individu-
alism and its abstract universalism? Or also, 
is it possible to save the classic harmony 
together with the modern fracture? That 
is, finally, is it possible to deal with the 
contradictions that permeate the society? 
And if all this is possible, then how is it 
possible? (cf. above all Lukács 1948, but 
also see De Giovanni 1970, Michéa 2006 
and Pezzano 2014).
Beyond this, such a question about 
the “overcoming” is not the same as, for 
example, “why things are”, neither as “why 
things become” and so on, because here 
the problem is not just that things are, so 
to speak, both always different and always 
the same. Rather, here the problem is that 
in their passing away, things do not simply 
persist, but they do “evolve” in a proble-
matic way, we can say. It is well known 
that the Hegelian answer will be that this 
can happen because things are lifted up or 
sublated, namely because of the Aufhebung, 
but here it is important to note that this 
kind of answer could have sense only in 
respect of that problem. Briefly, the role of 
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Aufhebung is to put together preservation 
and suppression, or – as said before – for-
mation and deformation, the fact that a 
form resists to deformation and the fact 
that deformation however occurs.
From another point of view, it is as if 
Hegel would like to understand how history 
works: in fact, in history, things do nothing 
but go ahead, but they are also “stored” 
or “saved,” and it is precisely in this way 
that they can become part of the history. 
Said otherwise, Hegel thinks that if things 
can be overcome, it is thanks to a peculiar 
process of negation that can both “erase” 
and “preserve.”
If we move from this, it is clear how 
identity and negation could play a key role 
in Hegel’s system: there is something (iden-
tity), but this is to be overcome (negation), 
in turn producing something else (identity); 
this “something else” is nothing but the 
reflected “something of the beginning” 
(identity and negation are all in one). Here 
we can see the general structure of Hegelian 
reasoning and conception of time: the “in 
itself ” could be not separated from its own 
“for itself ” in order to finally develop “in 
and for itself”; the origin could be not sepa-
rated from its own extrinsecation in order 
to come back to its own “originary future.” 
Thus, there could be different stages, modes 
or forms during the process, just because 
they are inserted in a progressive becoming, 
whose end is to put in light its own origin 
and fully develop its necessity.
As it has been insightfully claimed, 
Hegel’s logic is a narrative one, one that 
wants to explain the historical identity po-
sing a narrative connection between potency 
and act, and according to which every single 
mode is a moment of the identity of the 
Notion that should be finally “recollected.” 
In other words, Hegel’s logic is a logic of the 
Erinnerung, namely “one of recollection, of 
memory, its necessity is the internal consis-
tency of what is remembered” (Bencivenga 
2000: 55): under this regard, in Hegel’s 
world there is no real space for novelty 
and future, but this does not simply mean 
that for Hegel, once a story has been told, 
there won’t be any new event. Rather, in 
his perspective, what matters is that “all 
chronology has been redeemed: everything 
that is, and was, the case has been proved 
necessary” and so “everyone is at the end 
of (her own) history when she takes the 
retrospective, rationalizing position with 
respect to it”: for her, “everything has al-
ready happened because, trivially, the range 
of that “everything” is precisely what has 
already happened,” and for Hegel “there are 
no other demands: no reference to other, 
possible, future data even makes sense” 
(Bencivenga 2000: 69–70).
Undoubtedly, telling a story requires 
events, and new ones above all, so Malabou 
could be right under this regard. But the 
problem is not simply if Hegel’s system 
states that a future does not exist (this is, I 
would say, quite impossible); rather, it is if 
this system incorporates the question of the 
future as a decisive one within itself. Said 
otherwise, it is clear that identity demands 
for differences as material for its own diges-
tion, but, finally, this would mean nothing 
but the differences are to be assimilated. 
I would say that if any future counts for 
Hegel, it is the one of the future form, that 
is, a future to be ultimately recollected, to 
be in the end put into form. The future 
must be digested into the past, so to speak. 
In this respect, we are not so far from the 
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Aristotelian definition of ousia as the “what 
it was to be” (to ti en einai) of a thing.
So, the key point is that Hegel does not 
want to explain how something new and 
different could ever come, but how is it 
possible to encompass, reflect, comprehend, 
realize, incorporate, and so on, what has al-
ready come. In this sense, “Hegel is located 
at the threshold of the future” (Bencivenga 
2000: 71), but he is not really engaged with 
the future: he is more interested in how we 
can judge what has happened than in how 
we can avoid to prejudice what will happen 
(as Deleuze instead does). For Hegel, it is 
just a question of re-reading, acknowledge-
ment and recognition (of Anerkennung, 
or of the transition from kennen to erken-
nen) – or, as it has been noted – of brooding 
and digestion (cf. Bodei 2014: 129–136), 
although it may involve not a process of 
defecation, consumption and reappropria-
tion, but one of swallowing, constipation 
and defecation (cf. Žižek 2006: 348–353). 
In this respect, the final act of the process 
would be the “excremental” maneuver of 
dropping, releasing and letting go, instead 
of the “incremental” one of recontraction, 
recovering and reassimilation. But this 
means exactly that what comes in the 
end is not something new; rather, it is the 
recomprehension of something that has 
already happened, which in this way could 
be finally set free in itself.
To be clear, I’m not claiming that Hegel 
is wrong, or that his problem is irrelevant 
or uninteresting; I’m simply saying that 
this is his problem and the propeller of his 
reaso ning: one could easily say that grasping 
what has already happened is as important 
as – or even more important than – opening 
the way to what will or could happen.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the 
main experience that shapes and influ-
ences the position and development of 
the Hegelian problem is the way in which 
self-consciousness works. In fact, it is in 
consciousness that – at least in Hegel’s 
view – things are continuously “digested,” 
“removed” and “conserved” at the same 
time, and it is this movement that consti-
tutes the Self as such; it is in consciousness 
that – at least in Hegel’s view – everything 
passes in everything without going out from 
this same process, but, on the contrary, en-
lightening the sense of the process itself; it 
is in consciousness that – at least in Hegel’s 
view – there is no immediacy apart from a 
movement of mediacy, that is, apart from 
a reflection. The Logic is the Effective for 
Hegel, for sure – that is, what is logical 
is what is real (“the Real is the Rational 
and the Rational is the Real”) because it 
represents the structure of the reality in 
itself; but the rhythm of this Logic is traced 
from the proceeding of self-consciousness. 
What mind does is to ruminate. In Hegel’s 
view, finally, the fundamental activity of the 
Mind, Consciousness, or Spirit, namely, 
of the Subject, is the reflection, which – as 
re-flection – is led by negativity.
Moreover, we can observe – but this 
is nothing more than a first sketch of the 
matter that the main ontological concepts 
of Hegel’s philosophy are linguistic (just 
as the Aristotelian ones, as well): notion, 
concept, idea, noun, substance, subject, 
logic, being, nothing etc. One could say 
that they are nominal concepts rather than 
verbal, adverbial or prepositional; this 
may be true (as I will discuss again in next 
paragraphs), but – apart from this and fol-
lowing the theses of Agamben (2006) and 
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Virno (2013) – the point is that if language 
is the place of negativity, then a linguistic 
ontology cannot but be a negative ontology.
Lastly, this also implies that there is a 
strict connection – if not even a coinci-
dence  – between language and thought, 
between language and mind, between 
language and consciousness, as it is for 
Hegel: if Mind, let me say, continuously 
digests, it is because it has interiorized the 
digestive process of language; if Self, let me 
say, continuously changes form, it is because 
it has interiorized the process of nomination 
of language.
In a few words, it is as if the Hegelian 
perspective highlights that – as the saying 
goes – life is like photography, because we 
all need the negatives to develop. Under 
this regard, the Deleuzian perspective 
could probably underline that if life is 
like photography, it’s because we all need 
the research and the “capture” to make a 
creation possible.
2.3. How Can It Happen?  
Deleuze’s Creation
In fact, Deleuze said that if “why is there 
something rather than nothing” is a false 
problem, a true one is “why this rather 
than something else,” or – better – “why a 
thing is itself rather than something else,” 
namely, “why this tension of duration,” 
“why this speed rather than another” (B: 
13–35; DI: 24–26, 50–51): the problem 
that Deleuze formulates and poses concerns 
how it is possible that things are different, 
or – better – that things become different. 
Immediately, one could object that things 
are not different, but they are similar, they 
do share something, and this needs to be 
explained. This is, it goes without saying, 
one of the most classical philosophical 
problems, but it must be clear: this is not 
the Deleuzian problem. Deleuze observes 
that things are first of all different, rather 
than similar, and tries to explain why and 
how this can happen.
In other words, Deleuze asks how is the 
creation of the new possible; Deleuzian 
questions are such as: how is it that there 
is always something new? How are novelty 
and change possible? How can we account 
for a future that is different from, and not 
merely predetermined by, the past? How do 
things come out? His answer is firstly that if 
things are empirically different one from 
each other, it is because they are internally 
moved by a process in which the impelling 
force is not simply similar to what expresses 
and that they take in charge of its élan, and 
vice versa. Said otherwise, it is the internal, 
transcendental or noumenical difference 
that can explain the external, empirical or 
phenomenical difference. The point is not 
that things or individuals have or assume 
different forms, that is, that they become 
something (and can cease to be that thing); 
it is rather that things or individuals can 
transform, that is, that they always are 
transformable: what counts is the innova-
tive, and endlessly alive, core of things and 
individuals.
That the Deleuzian philosophy is a 
philosophy of the creation of the new is 
widely stated, also in several different ways 
(i.e., see Hallward 2006; Lambert 2008; 
Lundy 2012; Shaviro 2009), even if not 
all totally appropriate, and developing all 
the systematic implications of this fact with 
completeness is a work still to be done. 
We can say that Deleuze is one of the 
first philosophers who attempted to build 
something like an “ontology of what is not 
98  Giacomo PezzanoReligija ir kultūra
there,” whose importance is now beginning 
to be stressed (cf., i.e. Poli 2006). However, 
here I can solely outline those elements that 
could be more relevant for the comparison 
with Hegel’s thought. They can be sum-
marized as follows:
i) Time is future-oriented;
ii) An Idea is a principle of innovation;
iii) Everything is a problem;
iv) In a relation, there is much more than 
mere opposition.
Again, these elements are all reciprocally 
intertwined, but the clarification of such 
connections would take too much space, 
and it cannot be done here; hence, I will 
explain them separately and shortly.3
Fi r s t . One of the hardest and most 
debated parts of the entire Deleuzian cor-
pus is definitely the deduction of the three 
syntheses of time in the second chapter of 
DR (70–128). Thus, its articulation cannot 
be fully discussed here, but it is however 
important to note its structure: the present 
(Habit) is founded on the past (Memory), 
but the past is in its turn founded on the 
future (Eros/Thanatos). Deleuze states that 
ne fait revenir que l’à-venir: the present is 
the repeater (the moment of the return), the 
past is the repetition itself (the returning), 
but the future is that which is repeated (the 
“object” of the return). If there is a present, 
it is because there is a condensation of the 
past, but if the past can have effectiveness, 
it is because it is open by and to the future. 
The present is linked with the coexistence 
of states (contraction), but this relies upon 
the past as succession of states (collection), 
3 I have gone a little bit further in this issue in 
Pezzano 2016a, where more detailed refe rences 
to Deleuzian works can also be found.
which finally is grounded on the future as 
bifurcation of states (openness). What is 
relevant to stress here is that in Deleuze’s 
argument, the third synthesis is necessary 
to render the past searchable, explorable, 
problematizable and developable, and to 
avoid that the past would become a simple 
celebration of the mythical origin that 
would contain everything in advance. For 
these aims, it needs a force of searching 
and innovation, an action of invention 
and creation, that is, a dimension of time 
which is properly “rushing,” “leaping,” and 
“bouncing”: the future, the pure form of 
continuity and determinability. In this way, 
the future – and time in general – becomes a 
pure principle of novelty. The third synthe-
sis points out not just that time as future is 
pure variability; rather, it puts in evidence 
the force of the moment in which it emerges 
the new, that is, the propelling and even 
cracking dynamism that opens up to the 
creation of the new. It is proper in this sense 
that the third synthesis can be both named 
Eros and Thanatos, for the “erotic” tension 
of the effort of transformation is all in one 
with the “mortal” shattering of the trigger 
of differentiation – as if in the beginning 
was the “original delay.” In other words, for 
Deleuze, time is duration in the sense of the 
persistence of the creative endeavor and of 
the force of transformation (that stores in 
order to prolong and vice versa: memory), 
not in that of the permanence of a given 
state, but neither in that of the continu-
ous flow that simply devours and destroys 
everything, or simply passes away (panta 
rei). Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, time is 
the open process of the genesis of the new.
Se c ond . For Deleuze, an idea is not 
an objective model (Platonism) neither a 
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subjective representation (Modernism), 
because in both cases ideas are thought 
through the principle of identity and 
under the scheme of similarity and like-
ness. This part of the story is the core of 
the Deleuzian vulgate, but here it comes 
as another part, which is less-stated but 
is really important in order to understand 
some apparently weird Deleuzian pages 
(such as DR: 168–261): Deleuze conceives 
the idea as an invention. Deleuze, I suggest, 
is the first philosopher who has tried to give 
a true philosophical status to the meaning 
of the word “idea” which can be found in 
expressions such as “I have an idea,” “that’s 
really a good idea,” “what an idea!”, and 
so on. Deleuze, in fact, considers ideas as 
potentials that are already engaged in one 
mode of expression or another and that are 
inseparable from the mode of expression: 
a creator only does what is needed and he 
needs to do, and this necessity is a very 
complex thing in the literal sense, for it 
requires to be explicated or unfolded. In this 
sense, an idea is the in-between in respect of 
the object and the subject, and – more in 
general – it points at what has a potential 
that needs and requires to be developed 
in an original and creative way. An idea is 
not a static and atemporal principle, but 
a genetic and temporal one, it comes out 
everywhere where a transformation occurs 
or can occur: it is necessary, but just in the 
sense in which a need to be taken in charge 
in a creative and unforeseeable way emerges 
(it is necessary to do something, but what, 
and how?). More than in the question of 
the essence of the noun idea, Deleuze, let 
me say, is interested in the question of the 
modes of the verb ideare, which in Italian 
means exactly “to have an idea,” “to create,” 
“to conceive” and so on. We could even 
say of the “unground principle” of the 
metaphysics of the difference, that Deleuze 
opposes to the “ground principle” of the 
metaphysics of the identity, corresponds 
to the shocking “breakthrough” of an idea, 
that is, to the future as an empty form of 
time, which has removed any ground for 
putting in advance events and things in 
one order rather than another. Said briefly, 
in Deleuze’s view, an idea is a demand for 
creation.
Third . As Deleuze himself has under-
lined, everything has its own reason, but 
this is its idea, and ideas are problems, 
or – if you prefer – ideas are problematic. 
A problem, for Deleuze, has a specific 
ontological status (the cryptic “?-being” 
or “quasi-cause”), according to which it is 
distinct and obscure at the same time; there-
fore, it is objective without being already 
done: that’s why it could be described as 
a question. In fact, a question is nothing 
but an exigence, an impelling force, that 
is, something which moves and animates 
a process of development that: a) On the 
one hand, refers to the demand, while, on 
the other hand, it cannot be similar to this 
demand; b) On the one hand, tells about 
the exigence, while, on the other hand, it 
cannot tell this exigence; c) On the one 
hand, actualizes the inducing dynamism of 
the question, while, on the other hand, it 
cannot exhaust this dynamism. As Deleuze 
puts it, problems do not disappear with 
their solutions, since they are the condition 
without which no solution would ever exist; 
at the same time, without solutions, no 
problem would ever take shape. A problem 
is an active power that compels for taking 
charge of it and discovering its solvability. 
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In this sense, the problem and the virtual 
are all in one: the virtual is what needs 
an actualization, without predetermining 
which and how this could or will be; the 
actual is nothing without referring to the 
virtual, but the way of this referral is still 
to be created. When we ask a question, we 
are posing a sort of constraining instance 
of dissimilarity: how could it be answered? 
But, firstly, how should it be properly 
posed? What could it mean? Finally, it is 
an imperative not in the commanding form 
of “do this!”, but in the provoking one of 
“can you do something with and of this?” 
A question circulates in all the answers 
that itself has opened, without coinciding 
with none of them; that is, it makes them 
circulating and communicating: a question 
is the “object=x” that circulates within a 
structure and enables it to function as such 
(it distributes differences), and which, in 
its turn, is also produced by this structure 
(it is expressed through the variation of 
the differential relations). So, the affirma-
tion that Deleuze cares about is not the 
subordination, overwhelming, overtaking, 
overpowering etc. of something or someone 
else: this would be to all effects an affirma-
tion through negation. Rather, he conceives 
the pure force of the affirmation under the 
paradoxical form of the position of a ques-
tion, that is, under a problematical form. 
Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, a problem 
is what asks for the construction of a field 
of possible solutions.
Four th . Deleuze has stressed the im-
portance of the concept of relation since 
his first book on David Hume, and has 
again and again remarked it throughout all 
his work, particularly in his last interviews, 
seminars and interventions. What is really 
at stake in understanding the relations for 
Deleuze is the possibility to grasp nothing 
less than the difference-in-itself: a relation 
is external to its terms, but it also in some 
sense constitutes its terms (it can constitute 
its terms because of its externality). Hence, 
a relation is not “a thing,” but nothing else 
than a “thunderbolt” (the “dark precur-
sor”): the principle of differentiation, of 
pure alteration, which has not identity in 
itself and cannot be thought as similar to 
a given something, for it is the occurrence 
of an encounter, that can produce or not 
something, that can give birth or not to 
a “disjunctive synthesis”, that can be or 
not actualized. So, the “creative AND” 
(“in-between,” “in the middle,” “inter-
being,” “intermezzo,” “transversal,” “fold,” 
“interstitial,” “extra-being” etc.) is the pure 
power of the affirmation of the difference as 
such that constitutes the real genesis of the 
reality, because the relations cannot change 
without the terms changing. We can say 
that the pure relation is experienced in the 
so-called “aha moments,” in which we have 
an idea, just while it is it that comes to us: 
in similar cases, we become a sort of passive 
recipient of a message from a mysterious 
outside force; that is, we are activated, for 
we have the insight of a sudden and unex-
pected possible relation, which still needs 
to be articulated and developed (cf. Irvine 
2015). Therefore, the most important thing 
to underline is that the tensor-relation, that 
is, the relation as transitive and transitory, 
is the pure agent of becoming, the absolute 
vector of heterogenization, the virtual of 
the actual – for pure relation is at the same 
time completely undetermined (obscured) 
and fully determinable (distinct). Or, also, 
it becomes the name of the pure event, of 
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the pure temporality, of the pure duration: 
of the becoming in all its own consistency. 
This means that, for Deleuze, the difference 
is the most generic name that can be given 
to the relation, that this, any possible rela-
tion is first of all a relation of difference, 
a pure alteration, only then it can be a 
relation of opposition, contrariety, contra-
diction and so on. It is, in this sense, that 
difference comes first and all other kinds of 
relation, particularly the Hegelian negative 
ones, come after: difference here becomes 
constitutive of identity, rather than the 
contrary; that is, it becomes productive and 
genetic. Relations such as identity, analogy, 
opposition and resemblance, are all secon-
dary effects or results of prior relations of 
difference. Relations of negation, finally, are 
all secondary in respect of the preliminary 
relations of affirmation – in the problematic 
sense. Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, the 
difference is the Ur-relation by excellence.
At the opposite, we can synthetically 
say that, from a Deleuzian perspective, in 
Hegel’s view:
i) Time is the process of the origin’s reco-
vering;
ii) An idea is a movement of the reappro-
priation of its own sameness;
iii) A problem is oriented toward its own 
end-solution;
iv) Contradiction is the Ur-relation.
If, as seen, Hegel’s logic is a logic of 
recollection, Deleuze’s “logic of the AND” 
or “logic of the multiplicity” wants to be 
a logic of pure differentiation and of mere 
alteration – that is, a logic of affirmative 
creation, free from opposition and priva-
tion: a paradoxical energetic logic, as is to be 
explained. It is this same logic that Deleuze 
had already spotted in Spinoza’s world: “non 
opposita sed diversa is the formula of a new 
logic” (EP: 60).
In Deleuze’s view, finally, the fundamen-
tal activity of the “subject” is the position 
of problems, which – as questioning – is 
led by affirmativity, a spontaneous and 
unconscious affirmativity. In fact, to be 
more precise, in Deleuze’s view, there is no 
main-place for the subject, the conscious or 
the person in the strict sense, just because his 
insistence on the impersonal, pre-individual, 
or un-/pre-conscious wants to emphasize 
that the main experience of our being in 
the world is not the conscious or linguistic 
one (the problematic is the unconscious 
and vice versa). Rather, it is the “energetic” 
one, connected with the order of the affects 
and, above all, with the affirmative plane of 
reality. As a matter of fact, it’s easy to see that 
the main Deleuzian ontological concepts 
are traced from this kind of “intensive” and 
“active” experience or condition: power, 
duration, desire, conatus, sense, sensation, 
intensity, future, energy, force, movement, 
virtual, tendency and so on.
As it has been noted – even if with a 
negative accent – one could even say that 
Deleuze ignores language; that is, he em-
braces an energetic model made of intensi-
ties, connections, virtuality, immediacy, 
strengths, overabundance etc., in which 
there is no space for separation and con-
traposition, just because this model rejects 
the “linguistic turn” of the 20th century 
as the analysis of linguistic mechanisms. 
Therefore, Deleuze would not be not able 
to give account of the medial, negative, 
splitting or divisive phenomena: when 
he talks about “logic” (The Logic of Sense, 
The Logic of Sensation and so forth), to all 
effects he would always be talking about 
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“physics” (cf. Bottiroli 2013: 77–89). Even 
when Deleuze talks about concept, he talks 
about conception, namely, about the creative 
process of conceiving: he always points not 
at The Concept, but at a concept, at a process 
of conceptualization, at a process of creation 
of a concept.
My conviction is that in this respect 
Deleuze is less anthropocentric than 
Hegel: the first efforts to conceptualize the 
essence of the reality itself, conceived in a 
naturalistic sense, namely, made of forces, 
energies, relations, durations and so forth; 
the second disqualifies nature and attributes 
to the reality in itself the main features of 
the mind, conceived in a self-conscious 
meaning. However, I admit that at least two 
valid objections could be posed; the second 
could be considered as a development and 
a radicalization of the first.
The first is that Deleuze is actually just 
privileging some other linguistic aspects, that 
is, verbs, adverbs, or even prepositions, and 
so on, rather than proper names, adjectives, 
copula, predication and so on. This objec-
tion hits the target if we think that Deleuze 
often emphasizes linguistic traits, such as 
infinitive verbs, modes of verbal attribution, 
performative speech, pragmatics, indefinite 
articles etc., or prepositions, such as “be-
tween,” “infra,” “inter” etc., or conjunctions, 
such as “and,” “or” and so on. Nevertheless, 
if we look at the entire Deleuzian corpus, 
we can see that to Deleuze, all these more 
“active” and “dynamical” linguistic elements 
are the secondary effect, or the redoubling, 
of the main dynamism of natura naturans 
as such rather than vice versa.
The second is that Deleuze is “symboli-
zing” in concepts just another kind of human 
experience (desiring, sensing, being affected 
etc.), not finally grasping though concepts 
something like the nature in itself, and – 
maybe – he is not even conceptualizing the 
most relevant kind of human experience. As 
it could be seen, this objection raises, then, 
a wider and deeper problem, perhaps the 
most crucial for all philosophy: is it possible 
for our thought to relate, no matter how, 
to reality in itself? Hence, here I must leave 
this point4 sub judice, not only because what 
now matters is to stress that – according to 
the former paragraphs – Deleuze intends to 
think that pure effectiveness as such, that 
is, as affirmation/alteration/differentiation, 
is free from any form of negative mediacy, 
but also because in doing this he shapes his 
concepts referring to all those “energetic” 
events that occur in nature.
If Hegel continues the classic tradition 
of ontolinguistic metaphysics, based on 
4 For instance, one could also say that Deleuze 
is actually giving conceptual consistence to 
another dimension of the same “interio rity.” 
In fact, rather than on consciousness, Deleuze 
always insisted on thinking: the first is linked 
with a conscious process of mediation (logi-
cal, argumentative, rational etc.), conscious 
properly insofar as mediated; the second, 
instead, is paradoxically much closer to the 
unconsciousness, as it represents an effort of 
concentration, that refolding for which one 
is in the process of grasping or catching some-
thing, that concentration for which one doesn’t 
realize that a suspension of the ordinary use of 
faculties was happening. The first is on the level 
of good and common sense, of recognition (I 
am me), while the second on the level strictly 
creative, as – so to say – problematic and not 
mechanical concentration (“to be taken with” 
what one is doing). Actually, the moments in 
which we say to be thinking are moments of 
deep “unconsciousness”: moments in which 
we doubt, waver, hesitate etc. in an almost 
“ecstatic” way – atopic and alienated.
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concepts, such as substance, predication, 
judgement etc. (cf. also Chiurazzi 1996), 
Deleuze continues instead that sort of tra-
dition of cosmological metaphysics, based 
on such concepts as energy, force, field 
and so forth. Here, in general, eternity is 
not the permanence of a form (of a given 
substance), but the persistence of an effort 
of transformation (of a process): it’s not 
a problem of continuity of a state, but of 
“continuosity” of a lasting. It is not the case 
that Deleuze often uses a language full of 
images taken by the natural sciences, or 
that his work could have shown so many 
connections with some contemporary issues 
of the natural sciences.5
It is in this kind of energetic and, so to 
speak, prelinguistic world that, in example, 
all truth-criteria could be not a question 
of adequacy, neither of recollection, nor 
of reconciliation, but always of interest, 
relevance and importance, namely, of 
the expanding-power or of the capacity 
to extend (“what can…?”). What counts 
here is, I would say, the “differential coef-
ficient,” remembering that this does not 
entail a simple, uncontrolled proliferation 
of virtual forces, but the actual consistence 
5 About this, cf. mainly DeLanda 2002; Gaff-
ney 2010. But I can also add that some of the 
most relevant contemporary scientific ideas 
are, let me say, deeply Deleuzian. I.e.: the 
idea of a structural physical realism in which 
there is nothing but vibrations, that is, ten-
sive relations (cf. French 2014); the idea of a 
world made not of the endure of substances, 
but of the perdurer of processes (cf. Esfeld 
2012: 74); the idea of something as an ideal 
virtual empty element as engine of the entire 
universe (cf. Deacon 2011), or – lastly – the 
idea of an info-world inhabited by info-org, 
made of diaphora, that is, of pure difference 
(cf. Floridi 2010; 2011).
of the richest differences. In a few words, 
Deleuze does not say or wish that every-
thing would expand into infinity, nor that 
it is only through negation that there could 
be expansion (which would rather imply 
limitation); on the contrary, he says exactly 
that everything expands as far and as long as 
it can. Again, it is in this sense – as it should 
be clear now – that Deleuze thinks that one 
of the main errors of the Hegelian dialectic 
was to focus on the confrontation between 
opposing, contrary or contradictory solu-
tions, rather than stressing the importance 
of the affirmative and objective power of the 
problems, which is instead the real core of 
the Absolute – putting it in Hegelian words.
3. To Be Hungry. Trauma and Desire
It may seem that, so far, I have just drawn 
two more or less accurate drafts of the Hege-
lian and Deleuzian philosophies, in a too 
speculative, foggy and even partisan way to 
really be able to clarify why Deleuze is not 
and could not be Hegelian. For this reason, 
now I want to make an example, which 
could be a paradigm not simply of the irre-
ducible, essential divergence between Hegel 
and Deleuze, but instead of what, given 
a certain condition or experience, Hegel 
and Deleuze can differently sharpen. I am 
talking of the desire, which – as known – 
plays a key role in the Deleuzian production 
(mostly in the works with Guattari) and is 
also a key moment in the development of 
the Gestalten of the Hegelian Mind.
Before this, let me highlight another 
more general situation that can help us in 
this understanding. Think of psychological 
traumas: what do they reveal to and repre-
sent for a subject?
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In the Hegelian world, they act as a sort 
of formative medium, as if Hegel would 
renew the saying “learning by suffering” 
(already stated in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, 
but cf. also Gadamer 2004: 350–351), 
or they even represent – as Malabou has 
particularly insisted – a transformative 
opportunity. In other words, they denote 
that the encounter with the negative – when 
“removed” and “digested” – is even neces-
sary in that journey within oneself, where 
several forms of the Self contrast with each 
other and which constitutes the Self as 
such. I would say that the protagonist of the 
Hegelian transformation is always a subject, 
even when he projects himself toward and 
exposes himself to the unexpected and the 
unforeseeable, it is in order to become a new 
subject. As said before, every deformation, 
every reformation and every transforma-
tion is, first of all, a matter of formation, 
that is, a problem of the presence or the 
absence of a form. Undoubtedly, forms 
do change, but this means that one form 
is negated and this negation is negated in 
order to constitute a new form and so on: 
what counts, finally, is that a form is to be 
determined thanks to the negativity. Loss 
of form, restoration of form, becoming as 
passage from one form to another form: 
this is Hegel’s transformation.
In the Deleuzian world, instead, a 
trauma is a sort of a sign, almost in the 
literal sense of the problem, as a complex 
of hurling and hindering, that is, something 
which points not at an external limit (that 
negates the subject), but, firstly, at internal 
research (the movement of affirmation 
of the subject). In other words, while for 
Hegel a trauma testifies, first of all, the 
irruption of something that negates the 
subject and thus can be the source of his 
reshaping-delimitation, for Deleuze, it 
reveals above all that there was a demand 
still unanswered within (rather than “of”) 
the subject and thus it – and the subject 
with it – could be now better developed 
and shaped. Also, from the external point of 
view, a trauma represents an obstacle in the 
problematic sense for Deleuze: an event to 
be counter-effectuated, a case the prolonga-
tion of which is to be tested, an occasion of 
de- and then re-individuation. Involution 
and virtualization of form, diagonalization 
of form, the becoming as in-between forms: 
this is Deleuze’s transformation.
Said briefly, in the Hegelian world, a 
trauma exposes an external negation, that 
the Self should himself negate in order to re-
appropriate his own identity, insofar as this 
could have another form; in the Deleuzian 
world, a trauma shows an internal-external 
differentiation, the reemergence of a virtual, 
pre- and trans-individual question that 
should be tested, prolonged and developed 
in order to make a subject take shape, or – 
better – in order to see if and what a subject 
can do. If a Hegelian says to himself, “now I 
have to overcome it and leave it behind!” – 
a Deleuzian instead asks “how can this 
instance be reintegrated – if it can – in the 
path of one life?” In the one case, negation is 
the engine of consciousness’ development; 
in the other, problematization is the source 
of the construction of an experimental 
field. There, we are always looking for the 
result of the process, even if this would be 
only momentary; here, we are always in the 
middle of a process, in the enduring of it.
This contrast of Hegel-Deleuze may 
appear too dualistic – and it probably is – 
but I think that nevertheless it is useful to 
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better circumscribe the core of the issue here 
discussed, and to understand the presenta-
tion of the key example that follows in a 
clearer way.
Coming to the desire, here I don’t want 
to reconstruct all the aspects of its presence 
in the work of the two philosophers; after 
all, these are quite widely known, and 
there are also relevant specific texts about 
the comparison between Hegelian and 
Deleu zian ways of conceiving the desire 
(cf., above all, Adkins 2007). Hence, I just 
want to put in evidence some general traits, 
in relation with the previous pages.
If we look at the way in which Hegel 
describes the desire and its process, we can 
easily see the following:
i) The desire is linked (since the form of 
the animal need) with the feeling of a 
defect and the perception of a lack;
ii) The experience of desiring is thus expe-
riencing pain and sufferance;
iii) In order to respond to this and overcome 
the lack – that is, in order to negate 
this negativity, it needs to be negated 
with both the interior stimulus and 
something exterior to oneself, which, 
in its turn, opposes itself to oneself;
iv) When desires stricto sensu meet, their 
encounter is always a question of a 
struggle to get recognition, that is, an 
attempt to reciprocally negate the other 
and the negation operated by the other 
and so on.
Deleuzian desire has been often misun-
derstood or – more properly – it has been 
discussed mostly in the political, social and 
psychoanalytical senses, but not so much 
in the philosophical one. The consequence 
of this general attitude is that desire has 
been painted now as a free, revolutionary 
kind of energy, now as a free enjoyment, 
that is, now as a free flow to be celebrated, 
now as a free flow to be demonized. By 
looking philosophically at the desire and 
its immanence, instead, it allows us, for 
instance, to see that:
i) The desire is linked with the force of a 
questioning and the affirmation of an 
instance to be expressed;
ii) The experience of desiring is thus expe-
riencing intensity and energy;
iii) In order to respond to this and extend 
this quest – that is, in order to affirm this 
affirmativity, it needs to be developed by 
both the interior endeavor and the pos-
sibilities of encounter and composition 
with something exterior to oneself;
iv) Every interlacement of different desires 
gives birth to a process of differentia-
tion – that is, to an entanglement of 
problems and solutions that could be 
good as bad, expressive as repressive and 
so on – but which is always transforma-
tive.
Thinking of the image of the nutrition, 
for Hegel, it entails a process of annihila-
tion, assimilation and digestion, that is, the 
attempt to overcome the lack of the appetite 
through the negation of the immediacy of 
the object and the negation of oneself im-
mediacy (I negate the immediate form of 
the object by its transformation, I negate 
my own immediate appetite through work, 
I finally negate the object and my appetite 
through digestion). Instead, for Deleuze – it 
is quite clear already since his reflection on 
the tension between instincts and institu-
tions in the 1950s – it entails a process of 
expression, folding and satisfaction – that 
is, the attempt to prolong and extend the 
demand of the appetite through its flection, 
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the invention of a way to satisfy it and the 
composition of a good encounter, able to 
avoid poisoning (the appetite is affirmed, 
but also the object, because it is put in a 
relation that differentiates and expands 
itself, and the satisfaction produces both the 
I enjoying and a new configuration of the 
object). There, we go from the immediate 
to the mediate and vice versa by opposing 
negations; here, we go from the virtual to 
the actual and vice versa by repeated dif-
ferentiations. Or, so to say, what matters to 
Hegel is to come in the end to digestion and 
defecation, while what counts for Deleuze 
is to live in the middle of the process of 
satisfying and tasting.
Furthermore, if we take the master-slave 
dialectic, which is precisely one of or the 
main locus of Hegelian desire, we can focus 
on in which sense for Deleuze contradiction 
is – at best – nothing but a case of the more 
generic relation of difference. First of all, the 
relation of a master-slave cannot be consi-
dered a sort of monadic intrinsic property 
of the two subjects or individuals: in fact, it 
qualifies the relata not in the same way (one 
is the master, the other is the slave), that is, 
it characterizes them differently. Hence, it 
must be extrinsic to them, which is another 
way of saying that before and apart from 
the master-slave relationship, there aren’t 
such things as a master and a slave.
But this is not enough, and Hegel could 
even agree with this insight. Indeed, se-
condly, for Deleuze, what counts is that the 
relation of a master-slave makes them above 
all different with respect to each other, not 
that they can then be reciprocally opposite 
or against each other. Besides for Deleuze, 
we have two movements of affirmation 
(the ones of the “master” and the “slave”), 
which go toward a transformation when 
they undergo an encounter (the relation of 
difference), which, is in its turn, an affirma-
tive agent (the agent of becoming): all we 
have – in short – is the constitution of an 
open, problematic field. We do not have 
two subjects trying to negate each other, 
thus put in a contrastive relationship.
Simply said, it’s just like Deleuze wants 
to stress that we cannot take one kind of a 
relation (master-slave as a struggle to the 
death) and say, “that’s relation as such!” 
Rather, we should understand – let me 
say – what different kinds of relation are 
shared (mother-son, friendship, hammer-
worker and so forth), that is, the fact of 
being relations, of posing a transformative 
difference between the relata. All relations 
share the fact of being differences, of affirming 
differences, nothing more and nothing less.6
Going to the conclusion, let me add just 
another thing. Desire could also be a good 
example to understand the general frame of 
the Deleuzian “Transcendental Deduction” 
of time, sketched above. In fact, the process 
of sensing and responding to a desire could 
be described in three stages.
Fir s t . We are all enchanted in what we 
are doing at the moment – that is, we are 
all contracted with our present, we are – as 
Deleuze puts it – contemplating: we are 
simply all the same with our present acti-
vity, whatever it is; we don’t feel any need.
Second . The enchantment breaks up 
and fatigue emerges, revealing that we 
were not generating needs, that we were 
6 For a more general presentation of relations 
as a ground philosophical problem, see 
Marmodoro-Yates 2016, where also some 
important affinities with the Deleuzian per-
spective appear.
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totally absorbed by the previous activity, 
which solely now appears as such. The past 
comes over, telling us not just what we were 
doing, but above all that there was a 
“hidden” request inhabiting us (“so was I 
hungry?”). If we could be enchanted, it was 
because a kind of energy reserve was stored, 
but now it is awakening itself and us.
Third . It’s the time of the future, the 
real origin of all the matter. The energy 
reserve becomes problematic, it compels 
and animates us: the past undergoes forking 
paths. Now we can try to face this request, 
articulating its indetermination and deve-
loping its determinability, in order to find 
how they could be formulated, expressed 
and finally satisfied (“how can I satisfy 
the appetite? Should I?” etc.). Only then 
we could fall again under the spell of the 
present, of another unpredictable present, 
without knowing when, why and how that 
is, in a passive and unconscious way. And 
now, the eternal return can go on and on.
For Hegel, instead, it seems as if this 
process consists in returning to the (sup-
posed) condition of the beginning, that is, 
to the absence (negation) of lack (negation), 
where time is finally annulled, or – at least – 
where the recollection of all the stages of 
the negation has been completed, and the 
origin – that is, a form – has been regained. 
It matters less to satisfy the desire and more 
to apprehend retrospectively it, its meaning 
and its sense, so to speak; or – better – what 
most counts is that in the end the subject 
has found a new form through his labor 
and pain – namely, that he has digested 
and defecated, that has freed himself and 
let free.
We can say that in Deleuze’s philosophy, 
desire is nothing but the same of the virtual, 
or of the problem, or of the question, or of 
the pure empty form of time and so on. On 
the Hegelian side, we have desire seen as 
the loss of the best star and the subsequent 
painful need to recollect it, counting on 
the power of the negative; on the Deleu-
zian side, we have desire seen as openness 
of the sky full of stars, and the subsequent 
demand for the construction of the better 
circumstantiated constellation of stars, rely-
ing upon the dynamism of the affirmative. 
Aufhebung contra agencement, or recollection 
contra expression, to put it in a slogan.
Let me be clear: again, I’m not saying 
that Hegel is wrong, while Deleuze is right, 
or vice versa. One could say that even if de-
siring is active and problematic questioning, 
satisfying it requires de facto the negation, as 
it happens when – in example – you have 
to kill an animal, or to eat a killed animal, 
in order to silence your hunger; and here 
you are not taking in a generic, differential 
and affirmative process of composition of 
forces. Hence, I’m not saying that things 
cannot be seen as such, rather I’m exactly 
saying that things can be seen that way, 
or – better – that you can see them in these 
different ways depending on the conceptual 
framework you rely on.
So, it is in this sense that I’m claiming 
that Hegel and Deleuze do nothing but 
build different conceptual architectures, 
and that it is exactly this fact (the faktum 
of the difference) that – according to De-
leuze – Hegel is not able to focus; before 
that they reciprocally negate in order to 
determine themselves, things just diffe-
rence themselves and have to develop that 
internal difference that constitutes them. 
But this is also why, paradoxically, Deleuze 
ends up being radically against Hegel – as 
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if he himself could not resist to that move-
ment of becoming where there could not 
be a Deleuze-becoming of Hegel without 
a Hegel-becoming of Deleuze.
In the end, this ambiguity may indicate 
that, on the one side, Hegel and Deleuze do, 
at all effects, pose different problems, but, 
on the other side, they also share a field of 
coordinates within which these problems 
are posed and developed. In other words, 
Hegel asks how a process starts and ends, 
while Deleuze asks what happens in the 
middle of a process; but both of them are 
nonetheless asking if and how it is possible 
to think the process. Is this the reason why 
Deleuze, the philosopher of the “indiffer-
ence” toward opposition, could not be indif-
ferent to Hegelian system? Maybe, but this 
problem could be the start of another new 
philosophical system, which is yet to come.7
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TAČIAU, GALIAUSIAI, KODĖL DELEUZE’AS YRA „ANTIHĖGELININKAS“? HEGELIO–DE-
LEUZE’O SUSIDŪRIMO PRIEŽASTIS 
Giacomo Pezzano
Santrauka
Deleuze’as yra pasakęs, kad nekenčia hėgelizmo ir dialektikos. Šiame straipsnyje tvirtinama, jog 
Deleuze’as yra prieš Hegelį, nes turi ir siūlo kitokią filosofinę sistemą. Taigi straipsnio autorius tei-
gia, kad, norėdami suprasti tokio „bjaurėjimosi“ priežastį, turime susitelkti į filosofinį klausimą, 
išjudinantį visą delioziškąją sistemą (§ 1). Autorius paaiškina, kad pamatinis Hegelio filosofijos 
klausimas – kaip yra įmanoma dalykų įveika, vystymasis?, o delioziškasis klausimas – kaip įmanomas 
naujumas, dalykų pasirodymas (§ 2). Galiausiai autorius aptaria, kaip geismas gali būti laikomas 
pagrindiniu pavyzdžiu, parodančiu abiejų autorių perspektyvų išsiskyrimą (§ 3).
Pagr indinia i  žodžia i :  dialektika, prisiminimas, kūrybiškumas, transformacija, skirties 
filosofija, geismas.
